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10 February 1964

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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### DAILY BRIEF

Cyprus: Greek Cypriot government officials may be losing control over both security and irregular forces to extremist elements.

Minister of Interior Georkatzis recently was so concerned over his lack of effective control that he threatened to resign. Indicative of the present situation was the refusal of a Greek Cypriot gendarmerie force which was attacking a Turkish Cypriot village on 6 February to obey Georkatzis' direct orders to withdraw. Refusal of right-wing groups to accept direction from a central headquarters in Nicosia is leading to the "worst form of anarchy," according to the US army attaché on Cyprus.

Corresponding to the decline of Georkatzis' strength has been the rapid increase in the apparent power of Vasos Lyssarides, left-wing associate of Makarios, who is reported to command a highly effective and well-armed irregular force in the Nicosia area.

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While Makarios is aware of Lyssarides' extreme leftist connections, he apparently has done little to restrain him. The President may not be averse to the development of a rival to Georkatzis because of the latter's association with right-wing, anti-Makarios elements. Presumably, Makarios also wishes to

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[Retain the support of Lyssarides--who has close contacts in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization--in case the Cyprus issue eventually is placed before the UN General Assembly.]

[Ambassador Labouisse in Athens reports that emotional fervor on the Cyprus issue is growing continually and is affecting all Greeks, including the palace, the government, all political parties, the military, and the public at large.]

[The Communist-dominated United Democratic Left (EDA) is using Cyprus as its major campaign issue for the national election on 16 February. In an apparent effort to counter this, the non-Communist Center Union, expected to win the election, has decided to exploit the wave of Greek Cypriot nationalism and has come out strongly for Makarios' demand that the UN, rather than NATO, send the international police force to Cyprus.]

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South Vietnam: (The new government established on 8 February gives some promise of firmer leadership than its predecessor)

(By assuming the role of premier himself, strong man Major General Nguyen Khanh should be able to centralize governmental authority, although he says he intends to devote his primary attention to the military effort. The agreement of the popular former junta chairman, General Minh, to serve as nominal chief of state should help to rally public support for the regime.)

(Although four technicians have been retained from the old cabinet, Khanh has broadened the base of the government by including Vietnamese from all regions of Vietnam, as well as representatives of the army, politico-religious sects, labor, and the country's leading nationalist parties.)

(The leading civilian member in the cabinet seems likely to be Nguyen Ton Hoan, vice premier in charge of pacification, who returned last week from ten years' exile in Paris to assist in the cabinet formation. As a Catholic, however, Hoan is viewed with some skepticism in Buddhist circles. The prospects for harmony within the cabinet, which includes capable but ambitious politicians from rival factions, are uncertain.)

(Khanh's performance to date has evoked some criticism from other senior officers. One general has claimed that Khanh and two other generals are making all decisions, and the air force chief has remarked that the only change from the old regime is the arrest of four generals of the previous junta. Some province chiefs have remarked that no firm orders have been issued from Saigon since the latest coup.)

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France - Nationalist China: Paris seems to be mounting a psychological campaign to convince Taipei that the latter cannot avoid a rupture in their diplomatic relations by refusing to initiate a break]

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[redacted] statements by French Government spokesmen increasingly imply that Paris will withdraw recognition from Taipei if Taipei continues to maintain that it represents China in Paris. Such a threat might be expected to encourage Taipei to let France take the onus for the break rather than do so itself. The French purpose, however, actually seems to be to lead Taipei to try to retrieve what prestige it can by adhering to its principle of not maintaining ties with any nation which establishes relations with Peiping]

The Nationalists, however, are showing an increased willingness to hold their position in Paris, and it is not yet clear what French provocation would induce Chiang Kai-shek to break relations. Vice President Chen Cheng's statement, on 8 February, that the Nationalists would "fight to the last man" in Paris is the strongest indication, to date, that Taipei will hold firm as long as possible]

[redacted]

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Congo (Brazzaville): President Massamba-Debat's regime appears seriously upset by the rioting in Brazzaville on 7 February by tribal supporters of former President Youlou.

The armed forces suppressed the outbreak quickly and inflicted a number of casualties, which will further alienate the tribes. The regime has also mobilized leftist youth "vigilance" groups in defense of the "revolution" even though it is clearly in no immediate danger.

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Accusations voiced by Massamba-Debat immediately after the rioting that "certain embassies" were supporting "counterrevolutionary" activities indicate a reawakening of suspicions entertained in official circles last fall under similar circumstances about the role of French and US personnel. The US Embassy has reported several incidents which suggest that US representatives may have been marked as a particular target of hostility.

The affair has probably further enhanced the power position of the army and seems likely to strengthen the hand of the regime's leftist labor and youth leaders.

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NOTE

Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk is making a major issue of the accidental strafing of a Cambodian village by South Vietnamese planes on 4 February, and has referred the incident to the Geneva cochairmen--Britain and the USSR--as evidence of the urgent need for international action to protect Cambodian neutrality. He has also published his note to the US Government, in which he describes the killing of five Cambodians in the attack as the latest act by South Vietnam in an "incessant and murderous aggression against Cambodia." In addition to supporting his bid for an international conference on Cambodia, Sihanouk probably is seeking to rally popular support and silence domestic criticism of his recent moves away from the US.

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